10 Jun The Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill 2025: A Dangerous Reconfiguration of UK Asylum Law
Welcome to the first post of DPG’s new legal blog series! As the UK’s legal and political landscape continues to evolve, we will use this platform to unpick the implications of developments in legislation and public decision-making through the lens of civil and fundamental human rights.
This month’s blog focuses on the Border Security, Asylum, and Immigration Bill 2025 (the “Bill”), including its interaction with the Illegal Migration Act 2023 (“IMA 2023”) and the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA 2022”), the worrying erosion of protections for victims of modern slavery and key amendments adopted thus far. It critiques the Bill from a public law perspective, highlighting its apparent departure from constitutional principles and international legal obligations.
Current status of the Bill
The Bill marks the Government’s declared intention to “provide law enforcement with the powers they need to protect the integrity of the UK border” as stated by the Secretary of State for the Home Department in a Ministerial Statement made on 30 January 2025.
Following its first reading in the House of Lords on 13 May 2025, the Bill received its second reading on 2 June 2025 and is now due to proceed to the Committee stage in the House of Lords on 24 June 2025, where it will be examined in detail and amendments can be proposed and debated.
What does the Bill get right?
To its credit, the Bill repeals the Safety of Rwanda Act 2024 in its entirety and dismantles substantial portions of the IMA 2023. Crucially, it abolishes the Home Secretary’s power to remove asylum seekers to so-called “safe third countries,” a power that undermined international refugee protections and invited credible allegations of refoulement.
However, these repeals, while welcome, are eclipsed by some of the more regressive features of the Bill which either retain or intensify punitive measures introduced by previous administrations.
Retained Provisions of the Illegal Migration Act 2023
Despite earlier opposition to the IMA 2023 by the current Home Secretary, the Government proposes to retain several of its most troubling provisions:
a) Section 12 IMA 2023 – Expanded Detention Powers
Section 12 allows the Home Secretary to detain individuals “for such period as, in the opinion of the Home Secretary, is reasonably necessary” even if no immediate removal or decision is possible. This vague and sweeping power effectively permits indefinite detention based on executive discretion alone.
Such a provision would appear to run contrary to well-established public law norms, including the principles of proportionality, necessity, and legal certainty. There are concerns that it risks breaching Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), which safeguards the right to liberty and security, and that it displaces judicial oversight with unfettered executive authority.
b) Section 59 IMA 2023 – Blanket Inadmissibility of Claims Based on Nationality
Section 59 renders asylum and human rights claims from nationals of certain countries automatically inadmissible, save for “exceptional circumstances.” Countries targeted include India, Albania, and Georgia, despite persistent reports of persecution, particularly against LGBTQI+ individuals.
This indiscriminate approach would appear to potentially violate the fundamental requirement of individualised assessment, enshrined in domestic asylum law, the 1951 Refugee Convention, and Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR. It also risks undermining procedural fairness and access to justice by foreclosing genuine claims without substantive examination.
c) Section 29 IMA 2023 – Exclusion of Modern Slavery Victims Based on Criminality
Section 29 extends the exclusion of trafficking survivors from protection if they are deemed a “threat to public order” which is a designation applied automatically to anyone with a custodial sentence.
This fails to account for the often-direct link between a victim’s exploitation and the criminal conduct. For example, individuals trafficked into county lines offences are frequently prosecuted rather than protected. Excluding them from support would appear to contradict Article 4 of the ECHR, which prohibits slavery and requires proactive identification of and assistance for victims, and to disregard international norms, including the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.
What the Bill Ignores: The Nationality and Borders Act 2022
Despite widespread criticism, the Bill does not amend or repeal the NABA 2022 provisions that criminalise asylum seekers based on their mode of arrival. This includes those arriving via irregular routes, who often do so due to the lack of safe legal routes. The criminalisation approach also fails to recognise the fact that the mode of travel to reach safety is irrelevant to the credibility of the person’s underlying protection claim. The continued validity of NABA therefore sustains a legal environment in which seeking asylum can be treated as a criminal act.
Indeed, the Bill also goes further than NABA by creating new criminal offences including an offence of supplying or handling items intended for use in illegal immigration, collecting information to arrange unauthorised journeys to the UK, and endangering lives during illegal Channel crossings. It also introduces new powers to enable the search and seizure of electronic devices from asylum seekers upon their arrival in the UK, a practice which had previously been found to be unlawful in R (HM, MA & KH) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWHC 695 (Admin), a case in which DPG represented the Claimants, alongside Gold Jennings Solicitors. In that case, the High Court found that the Home Office’s secret and blanket policy of seizing and extracting data from the phones of all migrants arriving by small boat breached their rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and data protection law. By reintroducing similar powers without clear safeguards or individualised justification, the Bill risks repeating the same legal errors and undermining judicial findings that such practices are incompatible with fundamental rights and legal standards.
Committee Stage Amendments
Finally, the latest amendments to the Bill reveal an apparent structural reconfiguration of executive power at the expense of judicial oversight, individual rights, and constitutional accountability. Key amendments include:
- Expansion of criminal offences, including those targeting people who refuse “rescue” by French authorities in the English Channel.
- Provisions permitting detention in offshore facilities, with limited judicial review access.
- New powers for the Home Secretary to override decisions by the courts on individual asylum cases, which could potentially undermine the right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR) and the separation of powers
Conclusion: A System of Deterrence Over Protection
The Bill marks a continuation of the profound and troubling transformation of the UK’s asylum and immigration framework. By entrenching the criminalisation of vulnerable individuals, expanding executive power, and curtailing judicial oversight, the Bill unfortunately prioritises deterrence and exclusion over protection and due process.
From a public law perspective, the Bill is an apparent departure from the UK’s obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention, the ECHR, and foundational principles of fairness and justice. It reiterates the troubling narrative of using asylum law as an instrument of control rather than a safeguard for those fleeing persecution.
This blog post was prepared with contributions from members of our legal team including: Yashna Patel, Emily Soothill, Ralitsa Peykova and Unkha Banda.
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